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Key Points: 
• If the negotiations on the next Financial Framework fail in spite of the neutral Luxembourg 
Presidency acting as an honest broker, the Union would be faced with an institutional crisis 
that would add to the problems in ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. 
• The incompatibilities between the different Member States’ positions make an only marginal 
shift from the status quo the most likely outcome.  
• Given the pressures from a group of six net contributors who want to scale back the EU 
budget, the most probable scenario is that the overall budget will be lower than the 
Commission had proposed and that some of the increases for specific policies will be whittled 
down. The next Financial Framework for the EU would not differ much from the last one 
agreed in Berlin in 1999. 
• As long as the Member States regard the Union as a club to which they pay subscriptions, 
they will expect a juste retour in the form of Community spending. Community policies then 
risk becoming vehicles for ensuring that club goods and services are distributed equitably, 
rather than being justified because it makes sense from an economic efficiency standpoint to 
assign these functions to the Community level. 
• The historical determination of the EU budget with its focus on a narrow range of supply –
side policies, precludes any real role in the Union’s economic governance. On the contrary, 
the same issues will surface in six years time when the next circle starts. 
• What is now needed is a full reappraisal of the purposes of an EU level budget and the 
setting in motion of procedures to bring about an extensive change in what ought to be a 
key instrument of EU economic policy2making.  
• To break the cycle two ways forward are suggested: to build2in a mid2term review to the 
Financial Perspective, rather than locking2out change for seven years, and to establish a 
wide2ranging review of the EU budget beyond 2013 by the appointment of a groupe de 
reflexion with an unrestricted mandate to look into all aspects of the budget. 
 
2EU budget
By the end of the week, the negotiations on the next Financial Framework for the EU, covering 
the period 2007213, are due to reach a conclusion. That, at any rate is what all (or most) parties 
hope and their optimism is under2scored by the fact that there is no obvious ‘plan B’. Yet if the 
negotiations do fail, the Union would be confronted by an institutional crisis that would add to 
the malaise resulting from the problems in ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. The Luxembourg 
Presidency, which will chair the European Council in June 16/17, is seen as able to be neutral in 
the decisions and thus in a good position to broker a deal. By contrast, the next two presidencies 
– the UK and Austria – are among six Member States that have articulated a strong demand to 
reduce the scale of the budget by some 20225% compared with the proposals put forward by 
the Commission in February 2004 in Building our Common Future. As such, they will find it much 
more difficult to reconcile the competing claims for reform of the budget. 
This paper, while acknowledging that the negotiations will be dominated by the usual search for 
delicate compromises that leave every Member State only slightly aggrieved, argues that it is 
time to look beyond these narrow issues. The most probable outcome, whenever it is agreed, will 
be an EU budget that largely preserves the status quo, and it is politically unrealistic to believe 
that radical as opposed to trivial change is feasible. Nevertheless, it has to be recalled that the 
broad character of the EU budget was established nearly twenty years ago, for a more 
homogenous EU comprising 12 Member States and at a time when monetary union was no more 
than an ambition. The next section of the paper briefly reviews the issues that are likely to 
feature in the negotiations, as well as some that will not. The paper then discusses what role the 
budget could play in an increasingly integrated EU, and explores how such a shift could be 
engineered. Concluding comments complete the paper. 
 
The short2term issues 
The main challenges confronting the EU budget are, by now, well2known, not least because they 
tend to resurface every time a new agreement has to be reached. Indeed, a Martian public 
finance specialist who had last visited planet earth in the months before the 1999 Berlin 
agreement would find it easy to engage immediately in today’s debate. Some countries argue 
that their net contribution to the budget is too high and that this has gone on for so long that a 
new solution is needed, especially to the perceived anomaly of the UK abatement. Most 
countries deplore the continuing dominance of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EU’s 
expenditure, but no2one can see an easy way of curbing it. The Member States, on the whole, 
are keen to prevent any increase in the economic significance of the budget, despite advocating 
policies from which they might expect to achieve a somewhat higher share of EU expenditure. 
Nor is there any real enthusiasm for altering the way the EU is funded, despite a general concern 
that the progressive shift towards the fourth resource makes accountability more difficult and, 
arguably, is at odds with the principle of ‘own’ resources written in to the Treaty (Art. 269 TEC). 
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Following the 2004 enlargement of the EU, there are new challenges and expectations, notably 
the implicit commitment to the new members to restore the funding for economic development 
(cohesion policies) that was whittled down at the 2002 Copenhagen summit. The re2launch in 
March 2005 of the Lisbon strategy also enters the equation, since the commitment to a 
‘Community Lisbon Programme’ announced (paragraph 39.c) in the conclusions of the 2005 
spring European Council implies spending on Lisbon2related measures. However, beyond 
identifying these as being ‘in the interests of growth and employment, taking account of the 
need for policy convergence’ it is a matter for speculation what will actually be supported. Efforts 
are now underway to portray the Structural Funds as Lisbon2friendly, and much of what is under 
the heading of ‘competitiveness for growth and employment’ is considered to be Lisbon2related. 
The latest indications are, though, that both these areas will be cut if the Luxembourg 
Presidency’s attempt at brokering a compromise succeeds. 
There is, on the whole, agreement that the Union needs to spend more on two areas. The first is 
what is now called ‘citizenship, freedom, security and justice’, much of which will go on assuring 
the internal security of the EU, though even the Commission proposals envisage this budget line 
rising to barely 2 percent of the total by 2013. Second, the proposed new budget line for ‘The EU 
as a global partner’ brings together not only EU external security, but also development 
assistance and other tasks. Again, however, there is a gulf between proposed means and likely 
demands: the Commission proposals would assign roughly 10 percent of the budget to this 
policy area, equivalent to just over 0.1 percent of EU Gross National Income (GNI). Yet on just 
one component of this policy area, the contribution of EU Member States, collectively, to 
international development aid, the gap between the actual figure of just over 0.3 percent of GNI 
and the UN target of 0.7 percent is four times what the budget will assign for all ‘external’ 
policies. Only Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are exceptions because they 
are already above the target of 0.7 percent. 
In a recently released briefing note (May 5), the Commission mounts a defence of its proposals 
by arguing that a cut to 1 percent could only be achieved by making hard choices about policy 
priorities. The debate is complicated by confusion about the arithmetic. The group of six initially 
let it be believed that it was calling for appropriations for payments to be held at 1 percent (and 
thus 0.24 percent of GNI below the own resources ceiling) although the letter to Prodi in fact 
referred to the (then) current level of spending rather than explicitly stating 1 percent. 
Subsequent informal clarifications signalled that the demand referred to appropriations for 
commitments, and since the latter are typically higher than payments, the gap between the six 
and the Commission proposals (for appropriations for payments to increase to 1.15 percent of 
GNI by 2013) is larger than at first sight.  
According to the Commission briefing note, it implies ‘a 20% cut from the Commission proposal 
for 200722013: € 198 billion over the period, or € 28 billion a year in terms of commitments’. 
While it is inevitable that the customary horse trading will whittle down the gap, the Commission 
is surely right to argue that it cannot be achieved by cuts at the margin in major spending 
commitments or by dropping peripheral policies. Instead, as the Commission demonstrates, the 
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strategic choice is likely to lie between persevering with traditional policies such as CAP (for 
which, it should be recalled, a deal has already been done) and cohesion (where the new 
members believe they have been given firm promises), and supporting the Lisbon agenda. 
The Commission has also proposed a generalised correction mechanism which would have the 
effect (according to a simulation by the Commission) of cutting the net contributions of four of 
the members of the group of six and would also benefit Italy, but would mean an increase of 0.2 
percent of GNI in the UK’s net contribution. Yet the change would scarcely alter the net position 
of the new members, several of which were dismayed to find that they had to pay towards the 
abatement. Nor can the UK which, after all, retains a veto, be expected to support the change, 
though it faces an intriguing political calculation of what is at risk from a 24:1 stand2off. Equally, 
the UK knows it possesses a very powerful bargaining chip. 
 
Broader considerations 
Many of the problems in the immediate negotiations stem from an ambivalence about the 
underlying purposes of the EU budget. A persuasive explanation for why net contributions are so 
contentious is that so long as the Member States view the EU as a club to which they pay 
subscriptions, they will expect a juste retour in the form of Community spending. Community 
policies then risk becoming vehicles for ensuring that club goods and services are distributed 
equitably, rather than being justified because it makes sense from an economic efficiency 
standpoint to assign these functions to the Community level. The result is the often Kafkaesque 
manoeuvring to ‘bend’ spending to ensure that some countries receive a little more. Witness the 
range of corrective devices agreed at the Berlin European Council meeting to attenuate the net 
contributions of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. But it is also more insidious: it 
is the choice of policies which determines net contributions, yet to correct the imbalances it is the 
same policies that then have to be curbed. This runs contrary to the usual approach to public 
expenditure which is to start by deciding what policies matter then raising the revenue needed to 
enact them. 
In this regard, the Commission’s generalised correction mechanism may be a somewhat fairer 
system than the current UK abatement and the partial abatements conferred on four other 
Member States. A key measure to reduce the net contributions of the four mentioned Member 
States is that they only pay 25 percent of their ex2ante contribution to the UK abatement: a sort 
of rebate2squared. But the proposed correction mechanism does not deal with the underlying 
problem, namely the uneven incidence of spending. Rather, such correction mechanisms are 
unsatisfactory fudges: in essence they start with decisions on policy, and then subvert those 
decisions. Juste retour, in other words, is allowed to influence decisions based on political 
priorities and economic criteria about what the EU should do. 
More fundamental questions about the function of a ‘federal’2level budget in an economic and 
monetary union are simply off the agenda. Both theory and practice elsewhere suggest that there 
are good grounds for having at least some capability for budgetary stabilisation policy at the 
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same level of governance as monetary policy. There are also sound reasons for assigning 
particular supply2side policies to the supranational level. However, there is no evidence that such 
considerations enter the debate on the EU Financial Framework. 
It will not be easy to find a solution to these dilemmas. Many Member States undoubtedly find it 
convenient to confine the haggling to the difference between 1 percent and 1.15 percent, or to 
the merits of a little more on research, a little less on the CAP or restrictions on eligibility for 
cohesion policies. Battles about net contributions or being seen to win support for favoured 
policies are strategies that allow national politicians to claim victories. But what is lost in the 
process is any disposition to look outside the narrow confines of the immediate negotiations.  
Consider net contributions again. In nation2states, very large redistributions occur, both across 
geographical boundaries and between social groups, as a result of the inter2play between tax 
and expenditure systems, often with relatively little transparency. Residents of rich areas know 
they subsidise those in poorer areas, but rarely by how much. Even where there is an explicit 
horizontal scheme such as Germany’s Finanzausgleich, it only captures a proportion of the net 
transfers. The principles behind such transfers are not that complicated: equity and ability to pay. 
Equity, broadly, is the presumption that residents of a polity should be entitled to similar levels of 
public services, even if the local economy in which they live is less prosperous than other parts of 
the same polity. The ability to pay principle relates the contributions to public finances to the 
prosperity of the contributor and generally aims to charge progressively more to the richer. But in 
the EU, gross contributions are calibrated to be equal proportionally to income: everyone pays, 
roughly, 1 percent of GNI. 
 
Is change feasible? 
At one level, all this is readily explicable: the EU is neither a state nor a federal tier of 
government, as in the US or Germany. Consequently, what might be logical from a narrow 
economic perspective (top2down stabilisation policy, for example) is not just beyond what is 
politically acceptable, but invites alternative solutions. Part of the rationale for the plethora of 
co2ordination processes in the EU is that they substitute for having a single authority at EU level 
responsible for major economic portfolios.  
The question that then arises is whether there is a means of breaking the cycle. The 
Constitutional Treaty has little to offer in this regard because the relevant articles from the Treaty 
on European Union have been transferred virtually unchanged. Paradoxically, though, most of 
the seemingly intractable problems around the budget could be resolved pretty straightforwardly 
and without resort to major constitutional changes. Whether it is finding novel means of funding 
the Union, developing a mechanism to correct excessive net contributions or deciding on policies 
that should be administered at EU level, a range of technical solutions could be envisaged.  
An illustration is how to establish how much each country should pay into the budget and expect 
to receive in return. Applying the ability to pay principle, Member States could easily be grouped 
into three or four bands that would determine their gross contributions to the budget: these 
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could, for instance, be set at 0.7 percent, 1.0 percent and 1.3 percent of the respective Member 
State’s GNI based on thresholds for prosperity. Then, target receipts for each Member State from 
different policies could be set, as happens already with the undertaking to the new members 
that they will receive up to 4 percent of GNI from cohesion policy. The combination of these 
revenue and expenditure limits could then replace the current obsession with net contributions. 
Negotiations would, no doubt, be just as tough, but the advantage would lie in having an overall 
net position that was the direct result of political agreement, rather than the much more 
haphazard incidence of policies.  
The trouble though is that there is no easy way for more imaginative thinking on the budget to 
catch a political wave. Instead, the current seven2year cycle comprises two years of posturing and 
demands, last minute agreements at a hotly contested European Council at which horse2trading 
and side payments dominate, followed by five years of running the system and stoking2up 
grievances. In this model, strategic thinking about the purpose of EU spending and about the 
role of supranational budgetary policy in the overall economic governance of the Union has no 
opportunity to break into the political agenda.  
To avoid the cycle repeating itself, two ways forward can be advanced:  
1. The first suggestion would be to build2in a mid2term review to the Financial Perspective, 
rather than locking2out change for seven years. For various reasons, the coming period is one 
of transition, with a further enlargement scheduled for 2007/8 and the prospect of 
negotiations with several additional prospective candidates, so that such a break2point 
would be prudent in any case. To assuage the fears of those who fear indiscipline, the scope 
for change might be narrower in the review than the whole Financial Perspective, with some 
ground rules about what can or cannot be re2opened.  
2. The second suggestion is that there should be a wide2ranging review of the EU budget, 
focusing on its role in EU economic governance and that the Member States announce a 
commitment to a fresh approach, based on the review, beyond 2013. Such a review might 
consist, in the first instance, of the appointment of a groupe de reflexion with an unrestricted 
mandate to look into all aspects of the budget. The review would then be taken forward by 
exchanges among the EU institutions with a few to preparing a blueprint for a political 
decision in 2011/12. It is essential that nothing should be off2limits in such a process if it is 
genuinely to be effective, but also important that it be seen as politically necessary in a way 
that allows enough of the parties concerned to support it. 
 
Concluding comments 
The incompatibilities between the different national positions make the most likely outcome a 
marginal shift from the status quo with the concomitant risk that none of the underlying issues 
will be settled. The corollary is that precisely the same issues will resurface in six years time when 
the next cycle starts. Given that the character of the EU budget was largely settled in 1988, for a 
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Union of 12 Member States, this would be decidedly unfortunate. By 2013, the number of 
Member States will be at least 27 and the euro will be a teenager. Is it, then, realistic to restrict 
the EU budget to 1 percent of GNI spent mainly on just two supply2side policies?  
On the face of it, the detail of the latest budget proposals from the Commission (released on 
April 6) promise significant changes, with spending on CAP due to shrink marginally by 2013, 
the cohesion budget set to rise by a third, while that on ‘competitiveness for growth and 
employment’ is set to increase by nearly 200 percent, with large increases on research spending 
and on transport and energy. Big jumps are also envisaged for the ‘EU as a global actor’ and for 
the heading of ‘citizenship, freedom, security and justice’. Given the pressures from the group of 
six, the most probable scenario, however, is that the overall budget will be scaled back and that 
some of these increases will be whittled down. As a result, the next Financial Perspective would 
not differ that much from the one agreed in Berlin in 1999 that is currently in force. 
While many will, no doubt, claim that significant progress has been made, the argument of this 
paper is that adjustments at the margin, even if some of the planned big increases in expenditure 
on selected budget lines (such as for transport) survive the negotiation process, will not 
fundamentally alter the character of the budget. In particular, this outcome would maintain the 
focus of the budget on a narrow range of supply2side policies, but would preclude any real role 
in the economic governance of the Union. Instead, what is now needed is a full reappraisal of 
the purposes of an EU level budget and the setting in motion of procedures to bring about 
extensive change in what ought to be a key instrument of EU economic policy2making. 
 
